German politics is greening in unpredictable ways

Like no other western democracy, Germany stands for political stability, moderation and continuity of leadership. Since the Federal Republic’s creation in 1949, only eight chancellors from two political parties have ruled the country: five Christian Democrats and three Social Democrats. When Chancellor Angela Merkel bows out after September’s Bundestag elections, she will have governed for almost 16 years, 12 of them in “grand coalitions” uniting her CDU with the SPD.

Yet the impending elections are pushing German politics in an unfamiliar, unpredictable direction. The CDU is in trouble, unable to find a convincing successor to Merkel and damaged by corruption scandals. The government is struggling to get on top of the Covid-19 crisis and reopen the economy. Merkel’s level-headed centrism and personal authority endeared her to Germany’s risk-averse voters in four elections from 2005 to 2017, but over time they have eroded the CDU’s capacity to find fresh ideas and leadership.

The fragmentation of the post-1949 political order in the Merkel era makes it risky to forecast what combination of parties will come to power after the elections. But it is no longer inconceivable that the CDU, which is suffering a shrinking lead in opinion polls, will go into opposition. By contrast, it appears likely that the next government will include the Greens, elevated by the SPD’s decline, to the status of the CDU’s main challenger.

For this reason, the draft election platform of the Greens, published last month, merits attention. In power, the party could make a difference to German foreign, security and economic policy, especially if either Annalena Baerbock or Robert Habeck, the party’s co-leaders, were to become chancellor. It is the chancellery rather than the foreign ministry, usually occupied by a politician from a junior coalition party, which nowadays does most to define Germany’s international role.

One proposal of the Greens stands out. The party wants to stop the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project to import Russian gas across the Baltic Sea, an initiative dear to Merkel’s heart. The Greens make their case not only on environmental grounds but “because it causes damage on the geopolitical level — especially given the situation in Ukraine”. The Greens are more closely aligned on the controversial issue of the pipeline with the US and Germany’s eastern neighbours, such as the Baltic states and Poland, than with the CDU.

The Greens also sound tougher than other parties on China. They hope to co-operate with Beijing on climate change, but mince no words in denouncing China’s “flagrant human rights violations in Xinjiang, Tibet and increasingly Hong Kong”. It is worth recalling that they were the only German party to speak out last year against Merkel’s decision to fast-track an EU-China investment agreement — a deal that may struggle to win European Parliament approval because of Beijing’s treatment of ethnic Uyghurs in Xinjiang.

On economic policy, too, the Greens take aim at the orthodoxies of the Merkel era. In calling for a reform of the constitutionally enshrined “debt brake”, which mandates budgets balanced or in surplus in normal times, they are challenging a cornerstone of German fiscal policy during the eurozone debt crisis.

They want less rigid fiscal rules in order to raise investment in, for example, high-speed internet connections — an area where they describe Germany, not unreasonably, as being “among those at the back of the class in the EU”.

In effect, the Greens are making two criticisms of the CDU’s long spell in power. First, Merkel’s party avoided serious economic reform, preferring to ride a wave of prosperity generated by the welfare state and labour market initiatives of the SPD-Green government that ruled from 1998 to 2005. Second, German policy towards China and Russia became too beholden to business interests and was slow to wake up to the geopolitical challenge posed to Europe and the transatlantic alliance by authoritarian powers.

Whether the Greens can make an impact will depend on the election result and, if they come to power, who they govern with. Nord Stream 2, the debt brake and the Greens’ more tolerant migration policies are three potential obstacles to a CDU-Green coalition.

The views of smaller parties matter, too. The liberal Free Democrats dislike what they portray as the Greens’ penchant for “more debt and higher taxes”. This might scupper a “traffic light” coalition uniting the SPD and FDP, whose respective colours are red and yellow, with the Greens.

As for a wholly leftist coalition, that might be even harder to form. Neither the Greens nor the SPD share the defiant anti-Nato stance of Die Linke, a leftist party with roots in the former communist East Germany.

The Greens have matured a great deal since their emergence from the anti-establishment civic movements that swept West Germany after 1968. They see themselves as builders of a united Europe, defenders of liberal values and loyal to the Atlantic alliance.

Still, German governments are invariably coalitions. If the Greens are to hold office, they will have to make compromises. Germany’s allies will be watching to see how far the Greens dilute their plans for the sake of returning to power.

tony.barber@ft.com