The baleful phantom of border changes haunts the Balkans

Changing state borders in the western Balkans is usually considered one of the most dangerous ideas in contemporary European politics. So why has a mysterious document been circulating in Brussels this month that proposes far-reaching changes to the borders established following the wars of the Yugoslav succession in the 1990s and their aftermath?

The fundamental reason is that the western Balkans — an area that contains Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia — has been trapped in a strategic no man’s land for a quarter of a century. One useful way to calm the region’s tensions would be to admit all six countries into the EU. But this project, ostensibly an unwavering objective of the 27-nation bloc, is proceeding so slowly as to render it increasingly irrelevant as an answer to the region’s troubles.

As a result, it is proving impossible to puncture the expansionist dreams of local nationalists who would like to create, for example, a Greater Serbia, or a Greater Croatia or a Greater Albania. Uncertainty over the future of the western Balkans intensifies regional antagonisms and widens the scope for other powers, principally China, Russia, Turkey and the Gulf states, to extend their influence in the EU’s backyard.

True, there is no serious risk of violence erupting on the scale of the wars of the 1990s. But the enduring instability of the western Balkans retains its capacity to drag in outside powers and sharpen international tensions, as it did in the 19th and 20th centuries.

Let it be said straight away that the anonymous document doing the rounds in Brussels does not reflect the official line of any government in the EU or the region itself. Entitled “Western Balkans — A Way Forward”, it first surfaced on a Slovenian news site, giving rise to speculation that it had been drawn up by circles close to Janez Jansa, Slovenia’s prime minister. Jansa emphatically denied any involvement, as did other high-ranking officials in Ljubljana, who are busy preparing for Slovenia’s assumption in July of the EU’s six-month rotating presidency.

In fact, no one has claimed responsibility for the document. But in many ways that is beside the point. For some of its arguments in favour of border changes have been common currency among nationalists in the western Balkans since the collapse of the communist Yugoslav federation.

Take the proposal to merge the Bosnian Serb-controlled half of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Serbia. This was a declared war aim of the Bosnian Serbs in the 1990s, and it was effectively reaffirmed last month by the Bosnian Serb parliament. The assembly passed a resolution calling for “talks on a peaceful break-up” of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should the international community refuse to abolish the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo. The occupant of this office, invariably a public figure from the EU, monitors civilian aspects of the Dayton peace deal that ended the 1992-95 Bosnian war.

Then there is the document’s proposal to unite Bosnian Croat-populated areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina with Croatia, or at least to grant them special status. This fits the longstanding aim of Croatian nationalists.

Finally, there is the idea of merging Albania with Kosovo, whose population is mainly Albanian, and awarding special status to the area of northern Kosovo where Serbs live. Some prominent politicians in Albania and Kosovo speak openly of their hope that a Greater Albania will one day come into existence.

From what is almost the perfect recipe for conflict or even outright war in the Balkans, the biggest losers would be the Muslim Bosniaks of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They would be left with a truncated, vulnerable mini-state, exactly as Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat nationalists wanted in the 1990s.

This offers some clues to the authorship. Upon close inspection, it emerges that the document has nothing to say about Russian or Chinese influence in the western Balkans, whereas it makes three dark references to Turkey — whose presence is undoubtedly on the rise. It also complains about alleged “radical Islam” in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In other words, whoever wrote it is touching on themes dear to rightwing populist circles all over Europe.

To their credit, EU and US diplomats denounced the document’s proposals. But to defend the borders of western Balkan countries as inviolable is only half a policy at best. The region is in desperate need of more vigorous EU and US engagement. The longer western governments persist in their relative neglect of the region, the higher the price they will eventually have to pay.

tony.barber@ft.com